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Abstract 29 
Movements are essential for the economic success of the livestock industry. These 30 
movements however bring the risk of long-range spread of infection, potentially bringing 31 
infection to previously disease-free areas where subsequent localised transmission can 32 
be devastating. Mechanistic predictive models usually consider controls that minimize 33 
the number of livestock affected without considering other costs of an ongoing 34 
epidemic. However, it is more appropriate to consider the economic burden, as 35 
movement restrictions have major consequences for the economic revenue of farms. 36 
Using mechanistic models of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), bluetongue virus (BTV) and 37 
bovine tuberculosis (bTB) in the UK, we contrast the economically optimal control 38 
strategies for these diseases. We show that for FMD, the optimal strategy is to ban 39 
movements in a small radius around infected farms; the balance between disease control 40 
and maintaining ‘business as usual’ varies between regions. For BTV and bTB, we find 41 
that the cost of any movement ban is more than the epidemiological benefits due to the 42 
low within-farm prevalence and slow rate of disease spread. This work suggests that 43 
movement controls need to be carefully matched to the epidemiological and economic 44 
consequences of the disease, and optimal movement bans are often far shorter than 45 
existing policy. 46 
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 55 
Recent outbreaks have shown the sensitivity of farming industries to invasion by novel 56 
pathogens, with examples including: the 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in the 57 
UK and the Netherlands [1-3]; the 2006-7 outbreaks of bluetongue virus (BTV) to Northern 58 
Europe [4]; the 2014 invasion of Lumpy Skin disease to Greece and the Balkans [5-6]; and the 59 
pan-European spread of Schmallenberg virus since 2011 [7-8]. These recent experiences have 60 
increased fears about novel infections that may threaten livestock industries in disease free 61 
countries in the future, such as avian influenza, african swine fever, Newcastle disease, Rift 62 
Valley fever or brucellosis, in addition to those above. Once established, there are considerable 63 
difficulties in controlling endemic diseases in the livestock industry, as exemplified by infections 64 
in the UK such as Footrot [9], Scrapie [10] and bovine tuberculosis (bTB) [11-12]. Many of these 65 
novel and endemic diseases spread easily between the animals on a farm, which are kept at 66 
relatively high densities, and can spread between farms through a mixture of air-borne infection, 67 
fomites, vector-transmission and animal movements [13]. Of these transmission routes, animal 68 
movements have the potential to lead to very long-distance dispersal of infection, and yet can 69 
be readily prevented through emergency legislation [14]. For this reason, local, regional or 70 
national scale movement restrictions (often banning the non-essential movement of all farm 71 
livestock) are often one of the first control policies to be adopted when an outbreak occurs [15]. 72 
Such bans have the advantage (in comparison to say vaccination or other treatments) that they 73 
are independent of disease etiology and therefore can be enacted before the causative agent 74 
has been fully identified. 75 
 76 
The revenue of livestock farms is largely based on the movement of animals, either through 77 
selling animals to other farms or by moving animals to slaughter. Therefore, adopting any form 78 
of movement restrictions may have substantive economic consequences for the livestock 79 
industry. In the UK, a nationwide ban on animal movements and the “closing of the countryside” 80 
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during the 2001 FMD outbreak had huge economic implications for the tourist industry and the 81 
wider rural economy [16]. Given these extreme financial implications, and that money provides a 82 
unified measure for comparing multiple consequences, here we optimise infection control in 83 
terms of minimising the economic consequences of any intervention measure. We adopt an 84 
aggregate, national economic perspective and consider the total costs of an epidemic and the 85 
associated movement controls to both the livestock industry and beyond. In particular we focus 86 
on outbreaks of FMD and BTV, and endemic bTB, which offer contrasting behaviour. FMD is 87 
characterized by extremely rapid within-farm transmission and localized airborne or fomite 88 
spread [2-3]. BTV is a more cryptic infection, often only infecting only a proportion of the animals 89 
on a farm and can spread over large distances by infected midge vectors [17]. bTB is a much 90 
slower infection, generally infecting just one or two animals on a farm; problems with control are 91 
exacerbated by poor test sensitivity [12] and potential reservoirs of infection in wildlife 92 
populations [18-19]. 93 
 94 
Quantifying the economic impact of an animal disease and its management is complex. The 95 
economic costs of an outbreak fall into three broad categories: costs due to loss of production, 96 
control costs and wider economic costs [20]. The large-scale 2001 UK FMD outbreak provided 97 
some of the most comprehensive data available; it is estimated that this outbreak cost the UK 98 
livestock sector £3.1 billion with similar additional costs to the wider economy. However, it is 99 
acknowledged that these wider costs were more challenging to calculate as losses in one area 100 
(e.g. tourism) may have led to gains in other areas of the economy [16]. In addition, economic 101 
impacts may depend in a highly non-linear manner on the scale of an outbreak; a short duration 102 
outbreak may have a limited impact on farming, whereas a protracted outbreak can leave the 103 
industry unable to recover [21]. 104 
In the event of livestock disease outbreaks or the management of endemic disease, there are 105 
economic trade offs that need to be taken into account when considering a set of control options 106 
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[22] and the policy that is deemed to be optimal may be dependent upon specific demographic 107 
characteristics and the state of the outbreak as it evolves in time [23-25]. Recently, complex 108 
economic models have been developed which capture the multitude of economic interactions 109 
that are perturbed by an infectious disease outbreak and the subsequent control measures. 110 
These have been used to calculate the economic impact of outbreaks such as FMD in the UK 111 
[26] and South America [27], avian influenza in the Netherlands [28] and Rift Valley Fever in 112 
Kenya [29]. Here we use a simpler approach in which the cost calculation is comprised of the 113 
economic impact on up to five different sectors, linearly dependent on different attributed of 114 
each disease. This approach is designed to enable comparisons between different policies and 115 
indicate those that are optimal in reducing outbreak costs; we recognise that this is a 116 
simplification of the true economic cost of an outbreak, especially if different controls can 117 
generate extremes of epidemic size and duration. 118 
 119 
In this paper, we use state of the art mathematical models [2,12, 30-31] to investigate the cost-120 
effectiveness of local and regional movement control upon outbreaks of FMD and BTV and the 121 
endemic dynamics of bTB in the UK. Such policies, if implemented effectively, could balance the 122 
need of containing and controlling the spread of infection with the economic incentive of 123 
maximising business continuity for a large number of unaffected farms. 124 
For all three diseases we used sophisticated stochastic spatial simulations, which are matched 125 
to historical epidemiological data; these are used to address how costs (including culling, 126 
testing, loss of exports and tourism) vary with the scale and nature of movement restrictions. All 127 
simulations reflect disease-specific transmission routes and control measures. As such, 128 
localized high-risk (dangerous contact) culling is implemented for FMD, a range of movement 129 
zones (protection and surveillance zones) are enforced for BTV, while for bTB a targeted test-130 
and-slaughter policy is enacted. Greater information on the formulation of the models is included 131 
in the Supplementary Material. These three infections reflect different contributions of 132 
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movements to the spread of infection; in the absence of movement controls, the movement of 133 
cattle accounts for 28% (26%-31%), 4% (2%-15%) and 13% (7%-22%) for FMD, BTV and bTB 134 
respectively (95% confidence intervals are given in brackets).  135 
 136 
For a given set of movement controls, we consider five factors that may contribute to the overall 137 
national cost of the outbreak: (i) the number (and type) of animals infected, and their eventual 138 
fate; (ii) the number (and type) of animals culled as part of the control; (iii) the duration of the 139 
outbreak; (iv) the number of movements prevented by the restrictions and (v) the amount of 140 
testing that was undertaken (for bTB only). These epidemic descriptors are used to calculate the 141 
economic losses to different sectors: 142 
● Direct costs to farms are a weighted sum of the number of animals infected or culled. 143 
● Costs due to Welfare culls are proportional to the number of farm days (farms × days) 144 
where movements are completely banned. 145 
● Costs to the wider Agricultural Sector are proportional to the number of animal 146 
movements that are prevented by movement restrictions. 147 
● Loss of Exports is proportional to the duration of the epidemic plus a delay to achieve 148 
disease-free status. 149 
● Impact on Tourism is proportional to the number of farm days where movements are 150 
completely banned, assumed to give a measure of the regions of the countryside that 151 
are closed (FMD only). 152 
● Testing Costs (bTB only) are proportional to the number of animals tested, and include 153 
both costs to the farmer and those met by government. 154 
The precise formula used to calculate these costs are given in more detail in Table 1 (the 155 
implications of changes to each economic value upon the optimal policies can be assessed 156 
using the Shiny app: https://livestockmovements.shinyapps.io/movement_control/). We now consider 157 
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how movement restrictions of different types can minimise the overall expected economic cost 158 
of the disease, as well as which controls minimise economic extremes (as captured by the 159 
upper 95th percentiles). In this paper we take a national perspective, minimising the total losses 160 
to the country including government, farmers, wider rural economy and tourism where 161 
appropriate. 162 
 163 
The costs associated with FMD outbreaks differ considerably according to the scale of the 164 
movement ban and the origin of the outbreak (figures 1A and B correspond to outbreaks starting 165 
in Cumbria and Devon respectively; other regions are shown in the Supplementary Material, 166 
Supplementary Figure 1). We consider the outbreak costs from multiple simulations with 167 
interventions including culling of livestock on infected premises and on farms considered high-168 
risk (dangerous contacts; [32]), together with a localized movement ban surrounding infected 169 
premises. We show by bars the mean total cost (together with 95% confidence intervals) broken 170 
down into five key losses; it is clear that direct costs to the farm (dark blue) and impact on 171 
tourism (orange) dominate but show opposite trends with the radius of movement control.  We 172 
also consider extreme ‘worse-case’ costs (red dots) which are defined as the upper 95% 173 
prediction interval of all simulations. 174 
For Devon (figure 1B), direct farm costs predominate and the economic optimum occurs at 175 
relatively small radius movement bans (12-38 km – horizontal black bar); for radii below this 176 
optimum, the scale of potentially extreme ‘worst-case’ costs (red dots) increases and hence 177 
small-scale bans are far less effective. Even if the effects of tourism are ignored and we focus 178 
only on costs to the whole agricultural sector, there is still an optimal radius although this is 179 
increased (42-48 km – horizontal blue bar). Finally, if the main concern is mitigating ‘worst-case’ 180 
costs, the optimal radius is larger than when considering the mean (22-48 km – horizontal red 181 
bar). 182 
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For Cumbria the patterns look subtly different. Due to higher densities of livestock, outbreak 183 
sizes and hence direct costs remain relatively high even when movement restrictions are 184 
enacted nationally. An implication of this is that the total costs associated with national control 185 
are higher than those when there are no movement restrictions: it may be more cost effective to 186 
allow all movements rather than ban all movements. For Cumbria the optimal radius for 187 
movement bans is more tightly defined compared with Devon where there is more stochastic 188 
variability: the optimal ban radius for mean total costs is around 20 km, when tourism costs are 189 
excluded this increases to 52-63 km, whilst when mitigating ‘worst-case’ costs the optimal 190 
radius reduces to just 7.5-13 km. 191 
 192 
For BTV the potential control options are very different; culling has very little impact and 193 
therefore was not used as a practical control measure. In addition, while the 2001 (and 2007) 194 
FMD epidemics led to national movement bans, the 2007 BTV outbreak was controlled by the 195 
establishment of localised zones around infected areas, where movements from higher risk to 196 
lower risk zones were banned. Mirroring this strategy we focus on the optimal generation of 197 
three zones: an inner zone with a complete movement ban, a high-risk protection zone (PZ) and 198 
an outer lower-risk surveillance zone (SZ).  All farms within the inner zone are completely 199 
banned from moving livestock either off-farm or on-farm. Livestock movements are not 200 
completely restricted for farms within either the PZ or SZ, however livestock could not be moved 201 
from a farm in a higher risk zone to a farm in a lower risk zone. 202 
Our results focus on outbreaks initiating in Devon (although results are qualitatively generic; see 203 
Supplementary Figure 2 for outbreaks in Suffolk, where the 2007 outbreak started), which are 204 
generally larger due to a combination of warmer summers and higher host density necessary for 205 
sustained transmission. Figure 1C compares five different radii for the complete movement ban 206 
(different colours) and four combinations of protection and surveillance zones (PZ and SZ 207 
respectively, x-axis). We consistently find that not having any complete ban (purple) 208 
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outperforms all other strategies from an economic perspective, irrespective of the size of the PZ 209 
and SZ. In part this is due to rapidly increasing losses due to tourism, to the wider agricultural 210 
sector and due to welfare as the number of farms experiencing a complete ban increases; even 211 
ignoring tourism these results still hold. When no complete bans take place around infected 212 
farms, Figure 1D focuses on the optimal radii for the protection and surveillance zone -- 213 
assuming that the SZ radius is twice that of the PZ. For BTV (and assuming no complete bans) 214 
it is only the direct costs to farms (blue) and agricultural sector losses (green) that impact on the 215 
economic costs. We note that agricultural sector losses increase with the radii of the two zones, 216 
but the epidemic size (and hence direct costs to farms) is largely independent of movement 217 
bans, leading to the situation where it is optimal to allow free movement of livestock. Our model 218 
prediction of ineffectiveness of movement bans in controlling BTV broadly agrees with another 219 
UK BTV transmission modelling study [33], where movement bans were found to have a limited 220 
impact on controlling farm-to-farm spread even without the ancillary consideration of economic 221 
impact. 222 
 223 
Finally, for endemic bTB, we consider the impact of a combined movement ban and testing 224 
protocol, such that, in addition to the standard (test and cull) policy, once a farm tests positive all 225 
surrounding farms within a given radius are also placed under a cattle-only movement ban until 226 
they clear a subsequent test within 60 days. As such, waves of testing and cattle movement 227 
bans can propagate through highly infected regions. A scenario is also considered where no 228 
movement controls are imposed even when infected animals are detected (and culled). We 229 
consistently find that this no-movement-ban policy has the lowest economic costs (figure 1E) as 230 
it eliminates the costs to the agricultural sector that arise from movement restrictions, and that 231 
larger radii bans are increasingly costly. (An alternative policy that only bans movements from 232 
infected farms but still generates tests within a given radius, has a local minimum cost at a 233 
radius of around 2km; Supplementary Figure 3).  The economically optimal policy, however, 234 
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leads to a long-term increase in the number of infected cattle (figure 1F), whereas large-radii 235 
ban-and-test strategies are predicted to lead to far lower incidence. Importantly we note that 236 
there is relatively little difference in incidence between the no-ban strategy and the current 237 
policy of only banning movements from infected farms (0km).  238 
 239 
The results for both BTV and bTB contrast with the findings for FMD; this may be explained by 240 
the different within-farm dynamics of the infections. Given that FMD is directly transmitted and 241 
highly infectious, any movement of an infected animal into a naive farm leads to rapid infection 242 
of all livestock on the farm, hence movements are extremely detrimental. In contrast, BTV is 243 
vector transmitted such that infection can readily escape the farm environment by the 244 
movement of vectors. In addition the weakly transmissible nature of both bTB and BTV means 245 
that there is only limited saturation (density dependent effects) of infection on farms; this means 246 
that the movement of an infected animal simply transfers the risk of infection to animals on the 247 
new farm rather than on the farm of origin.  248 
 249 
The economic parameters used in this work (Table 1) have been based on government agency 250 
assessments of national costs associated with each disease. However, such parameters are 251 
open to different interpretations and will be influenced by both the scale of the outbreak and the 252 
current economic climate. In addition different organisations may wish to alternative 253 
perspectives, by focusing on losses to particular sectors, such as the farming industry or 254 
government. This entire range of sensitivity can be explored through the online Shiny app 255 
(https://livestockmovements.shinyapps.io/Movement_Control/), which allows the individual 256 
economic parameters to be varied (although sensitivity to individual economic values is 257 
considered in the Supplementary Material – see Supplementary Figure 4). In general we find 258 
that the optimal movement ban radius for FMD is most sensitive to the costs of livestock and 259 
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tourism losses, while for BTV and bTB the optimal radius only changes at extremes of economic 260 
costs. 261 
 262 
For a policy of movement bans to be effective, it must be enforceable. There is an argument 263 
that a nationwide ban, where all livestock movements are prevented, could be more enforceable 264 
as it is more obvious when the ban is being broken. In addition, a regional ban may meet 265 
opposition from farmers just within the radius of the movement ban who view themselves 266 
penalised relative to farms just outside the radius. However, localised movement bans ﴾of the 267 
form instigated during the 2006 bluetongue epidemic﴿ allow resources to be concentrated into a 268 
smaller regions, and hence it may be easier to enforce compliance. This may be particularly the 269 
case in lower and middle income countries, when typically interventions are initiated at the local 270 
level in response to livestock disease outbreaks [33]. Incorporating such factors into 271 
mathematical models requires the ability to predict farmer behaviour which is likely to be 272 
complex and heterogeneous, and beyond the scope of this work.  273 
 274 
This suite of model predictions demonstrate that movement restrictions have a dramatic impact 275 
on the national cost of livestock diseases, such that large-scale movement bans are generally 276 
prohibitively expensive. By considering these three very different infections, we draw the 277 
general conclusion that movement bans are most needed for diseases like FMD, where there is 278 
considerable within farm transmission and where movements form a dominant source of long-279 
range transmission. For slower spreading infections, exemplified by bTB and BTV, it may be 280 
economically preferable to allow movements to continue unrestricted. Optimisation of movement 281 
restrictions, informed by bespoke predictive models, has the potential to dramatically reduce the 282 
cost of an outbreak: balancing the need for control and containment with the desire to maintain 283 
the economic viability of the livestock industry. 284 
 285 
 12
  286 
 13
References 287 
1. Gibbens, J. C. et al. Descriptive epidemiology of the 2001 foot-and-mouth disease epidemic 288 
in Great Britain: the first five months. Veterinary Record 149, 729-743 (2001). 289 
2. Keeling, M. J. et al. Dynamics of the 2001 UK Foot and Mouth Epidemic: Stochastic Dispersal 290 
in a Heterogeneous Landscape. Science 294, 813-817 (2001). 291 
3. Ferguson, N. M., Donnelly C. A. & Anderson, R. M. The Foot-and-Mouth Epidemic in Great 292 
Britain: Pattern of Spread and Impact of Interventions. Science 292, 1155-1160 (2001). 293 
4. Saegerman, C., Berkvens, D. & Mellor, P.S. Bluetongue epidemiology in the European Union. 294 
Emerging Infectious Diseases. National Center for Infectious Diseases 14(4), 539–544 (2008). 295 
5. Mercier, A. et al. Spread rate of lumpy skin disease in the Balkans, 2015-16. Transbound. 296 
Emerg. Dis. 65(1), 240-243 (2018). 297 
6. Tasioudi, K.E. et al. Emergence of Lumpy Skin Disease in Greece, 2015. Transbound. 298 
Emerg. Dis. 63(3), 260-265 (2016). 299 
7. Docuel, V., et al. Epidemiology, molecular virology and diagnostics of Schmallenberg virus, 300 
an emerging orthobunyavirus in Europe. Veterinary Research 44, 31 (2013). 301 
8. Hoffmann, B. et al. Novel Orthobunyavirus in Cattle, Europe, 2011. Emerging Infectious 302 
Diseases 18(3), 469-472 (2012). 303 
9. Green, L. E. & George, T. R. N. Assessment of current knowledge of footrot in sheep with 304 
particular reference to Dichelobacter nodosus and implications for elimination or control 305 
strategies for sheep in Great Britain. Veterinary Journal 175(2), 173-180 (2008). 306 
10. Baylis, M. & McIntyre K. M. Scrapie control under new strain. Nature 432, 810-811 (2004). 307 
11. Schiller, I. et al. Bovine tuberculosis: a review of current and emerging diagnostic techniques 308 
in view of their relevance for disease control and eradication. Transbound. Emerg. Dis. 57(4), 309 
205-220 (2010). 310 
12. Brooks Pollock, E., Roberts, G. O. & Keeling, M. J. A dynamic model of bovine tuberculosis 311 
spread and control in Great Britain. Nature 511, 228-231 (2014). 312 
13. Garcia-Alvarez, L., Webb, C. R. & Holmes, M. A. A novel field-based approach to validate 313 
the use of network models for disease spread between dairy herds. Epidemiology and Infection 314 
139, 1863-1874 (2011). 315 
14. Kiss, I. Z., Green, D. M., Kao, R. R. The effect of network mixing patterns on epidemic 316 
dynamics and the efficacy of disease contact tracing. J. Roy. Soc. Interface 5(24), 791-799 317 
(2008). 318 
 14
15. DEFRA Contingency plan for exotic notifiable diseases of animals in England. 319 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/contingency-plan-for-exotic-notifiable-diseases-of-320 
animals-in-england (2017). 321 
16. Thompson, D., Muriel, P., Russell, D., Osborne, P. et al. (2002). Economic costs of the foot 322 
and mouth disease outbreak in the United Kingdom in 2001. Rev. Sci. Tech. 21(3), 675-687. 323 
17. Elbers A. et al. Field observations during the bluetongue serotype 8 epidemic in 2006: I. 324 
Detection of first outbreaks and clinical signs in sheep and cattle in Belgium, France and the 325 
Netherlands. Preventive Veterinary Medicine 87, 21–30 (2008). 326 
18. Krebs, J. et al. Bovine Tuberculosis in Cattle and Badgers. 327 
http://www.bovinetb.info/docs/krebs.pdf  (1997). 328 
19. Donnelly, C. A. & Nouvellet, P. The contribution of badgers to confirmed tuberculosis in 329 
cattle in high-incidence areas in England. PLoS Curr. Outbreaks, 330 
ecurrents.outbreaks.097a904d3f3619db2fe78d24bc776098 (2013). 331 
20. Inamura M., Rushton J. & Antón J. Risk Management of Outbreaks of Livestock Diseases. 332 
OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 91, OECD Publishing, Paris (2015).  333 
21. Yang, P. C., Chu R. M., Chung W. B., & Sung H. T. Epidemiological characteristics and 334 
financial costs of the 1997 foot-and-mouth disease epidemic in Taiwan. Veterinary Record 145, 335 
731-734 (1999). 336 
22. Bicknell, K.B., Wilen, J.E. & Howitt, R.E. Public policy and private incentives for livestock 337 
disease control. Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 43(4), 501-521 338 
(2002). 339 
23. Epanchin-Niell, R.S. & Wilen, J.E. Optimal spatial control of biological invasions. Journal of 340 
Environmental Economics and Management 63(2), 260-270 (2012). 341 
24. Olson, L.J. & Roy, S. Controlling a biological invasion: a non-classical dynamic economic 342 
model. Economic Theory 36(3), 453-469 (2008). 343 
25. Probert, W.J.M. et al. Real-time decision-making during emergency disease outbreaks. 344 
PLOS Computational Biology 14(7), e1006202 (2018). 345 
26. Feng, S., Patton, M. & Davis, J. Market Impact of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Control 346 
Strategies: A UK Case Study. Front. Vet. Sci. 4:129 (2017). 347 
27. Rich, K. M. & Winter-Nelson, A. An Integrated Epidemiological-Economic Analysis of Foot 348 
and Mouth Disease: Applications to the Southern Cone of South America, American Journal of 349 
Agricultural Economics, 89: 682–697 (2007). 350 
28. Longworth, N., Mourits, M. C. & Saatkamp H. W. Economic Analysis of HPAI Control in the 351 
Netherlands II: Comparison of Control Strategies. Transbound Emerg Dis, 61: 217-232 (2014). 352 
 15
29. Rich, K. M. & Wanyoike, F. An assessment of the regional and national socio-economic 353 
impacts of the 2007 Rift Valley fever outbreak in Kenya. Am J Trop Med Hyg, 83(2 Suppl):52-7 354 
(2017). 355 
30. Tildesley, M. J. et al. Optimal reactive vaccination strategies for a foot-and-mouth outbreak 356 
in the UK. Nature 440, 83-86 (2016). 357 
31. Brand, S. P. C. & Keeling, M. J. The impact of temperature changes on vector- borne 358 
disease transmission: Culicoides midges and bluetongue virus. J. R. Soc. Interface 14, 359 
20160481 (2017). 360 
32. Woolhouse, M. et al. Epidemiology. Foot-and-mouth disease under control in the UK. Nature 361 
411, 258-259 (2001). 362 
33. Sumner, T., Orton, R. J., Green, D. M., Kao, R. R. & Gubbins, S. Quantifying the roles of 363 
host movement and vector dispersal in the transmission of vector-borne diseases of livestock. 364 
PLoS Comput Biol. 13(4), e1005470–22 (2017). 365 
34. Casey-Bryars, M. et al. Waves of endemic foot-and-mouth disease in eastern Africa suggest 366 
feasibility of proactive vaccination approaches. Nature Ecology and Evolution. 2(9), 1449-1457 367 
(2018).  368 
35. Anderson, I. Foot & mouth disease 2001: lessons to be learned inquiry report. The 369 
Stationary Office; London, UK (2002). 370 
36. Gunn, G. et al. Assessing the economic impact of different bluetongue virus (BTV) incursion 371 
scenarios in Scotland. Scottish Agricultural College on behalf of the Centre of Excellence in 372 
Epidemiology, Population Health and Disease Control. 2008:1-86 (2008). 373 
37. DEFRA Measures to address bovine TB in badgers. 374 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/measures-to-address-bovine-tuberculosis-in-375 
badgers-impact-assessment (2011). 376 
 377 
Correspondence Information 378 
All correspondence and requests for materials relating to this paper should be addressed to the 379 
corresponding author, Mike Tildesley at M.J.Tildesley@warwick.ac.uk. 380 
 Acknowledgements 381 
MJT and MJT acknowledge support from the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research 382 
Council [Grant Number BB/K010972/4]. We are grateful to Matt Ferrari and Will Probert for 383 
useful discussions regarding this manuscript. 384 
Author Contributions 385 
 16
MJT, SB, EBP and MW carried out simulations using the three livestock disease models. NB 386 
developed the Shiny app for visualisation of sensitivity analysis. MJK and MJT analysed the 387 
outputs of the simulation models. MJK led the sensitivity analysis of the modelling results and 388 
provided intellectual expertise on all three livestock disease models. All authors contributed to 389 
the writing of this manuscript. 390 
Data Availability Statement 391 
The raw simulation data used to create figure 1 in the main text and all figures in the 392 
supplementary material can be made available upon acceptance of this manuscript. The 393 
authors do not have permission to share the farm level data for the United Kingdom. However, 394 
the demographic data that includes farm locations, farm sizes and species composition, as well 395 
as the data on livestock movements between farms can be via the RADAR system by 396 
emailing RADAR@apha.gsi.gov.uk. 397 
Code Availability Statement 398 
The code used to create analyse the raw data and produce the figures presented in this 399 
manuscript will be made available upon acceptance of this manuscript. The code for the 400 
simulation models can be accessed by contacting the relevant contributing author: (i) for the 401 
foot-and-mouth disease model, Mike Tildesley; (ii) for the Blue tongue virus model, Sam Brand 402 
and (iii) for the bovine Tuberculosis model Ellen Brooks Pollock. 403 
Competing Interests Statement 404 
The authors declare that they have no competing interests as defined by Nature Research, or 405 
other interests that might be perceived to influence the interpretation of the article.  406 
Figure Legends 407 
FIGURE 1. Impact of movement bans on the cost of livestock infectious diseases. Panels A and B 408 
show results for FMD epidemics seeded in 5 infected farms in Cumbria and Devon, respectively. Stacked 409 
(coloured) bars represent the different costs: direct farm losses, welfare loses, loses to the general 410 
agricultural sector, lost revenue due to export bans and the losses to the tourist industry (as quantified in 411 
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Table 1). Red points (with confidence intervals from bootstrapping) represent the upper 95% prediction 412 
interval on the costs. Horizontal bars show the optimal movement ban radius to minimise different 413 
economic measures: black bar average total costs; blue bar average cost without tourism losses; red bar 414 
the upper 95% prediction interval. Panels C and D focus on bluetongue outbreaks initiated in Devon. In C 415 
we consider the mean outbreak cost, and vary both the inner radius where movements are completely 416 
banned (colours) and the Protection / Surveillance zones where only outward movements are banned 417 
(grouped on the x-axis). In D we focus solely on the Protection / Surveillance zones, using the same 418 
format as graphs A and B. Panels E and F present results for bovine tuberculosis, simulations are run for 419 
14 years with alternative movement controls and testing implemented for the last 6 years, and the costs 420 
averaged across all years of alternative control. As in other panels, in E we show means, extremes and 421 
the associated confidence intervals. In F, we demonstrate the epidemiological consequences of 422 
alternative control policies, showing the incidence of new infections that we note can be very different 423 
from the number of detected infections owing to both test sensitivity and spatial patterns of testing. 424 
Table 425 
Type of Cost Calculated as: Reference 
Direct Farm 
Costs (FMD) 
£1962×Culled Cattle + £523×Culled Sheep [16, 35] 
Direct Farm 
Costs (BTV) 
£145×Infected Cattle + £29×Infected Sheep + £203×Sheep 
Deaths 
[36] 
Direct Farm 
Costs (bTB) 
£1557×Infected Cattle + £531×Breakdowns [37] 
Welfare Costs £8.00×Farm Days Restricted [16, 35] 
Agricultural 
Sector losses 
£227×Animal Movements Prevented [16, 35] 
Export Losses 
(FMD only) 
£655,000× (Duration of Export Ban) [16, 35] 
Tourism 
 (FMD & BTV) 
£271×Farm Days Restricted [16, 35] 
Testing  
(bTB only) 
£10×Cattle tested 
(approx £2.50 to farmer and £7.50 for performing the test) 
[37] 
 426 
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TABLE 1. Costs related to movement bans for the three livestock diseases: Foot-and-Mouth Disease 427 
(FMD), Bluetongue Virus (BTV) and bovine Tuberculosis (bTB). All costs have been inflated from the date 428 
the assessments were made to generate prices relevant for 2019. Here Farm Days Restricted refers to 429 
the number of farms each day that are placed under movement restrictions summed across the epidemic. 430 
 431 
 432 
 433 
Methods 434 
The FMD Model 435 
The mathematical model utilised in this paper is a modified version of the FMD model used both 436 
during and after the 2001 outbreak by Keeling and co-workers to predict the spread of disease 437 
and the impact of control [2, 26]. Infection between farms can occur via two mechanisms – 438 
movements of infected livestock and local, distance-dependent transmission. The local 439 
transmission component of the model encapsulates the risks associated with aerosol spread, 440 
direct contact of infectious and susceptible animals or fomites (i.e. contaminated vehicles or 441 
farm equipment). The rate at which an infectious farm j transmits infection to a susceptible farm i 442 
via local spread is given by: 443 
ܴ௜,௝ = ෍ߪ௞ ௞ܰ,௜௣ೖ
௞
		×෍߬௟ ௟ܰ,௝௤ೖ
௟
		× 		ܭ൫݀௜௝൯	
σk represents the susceptibility of species k on susceptible farm i, τl is the transmissibility of 444 
species l on farm j, Nk,i is the number of animals of species k on farm I and pk and qk are power- 445 
law parameters accounting for a non-linear increase in susceptibility and transmissibility as 446 
animal numbers on a farm increase. Previous work has found that this power-law model 447 
provides a closer fit to the 2001 data than one in which the powers are set to unity [38-41]. K(dij) 448 
is a distance dependent transmission kernel that is estimated from contact tracing data from the 449 
2001 outbreak [2]. In line with previous work [39], all model parameters are estimated for five 450 
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distinct regions: Cumbria, Devon, the rest of England (excluding Cumbria and Devon), Wales 451 
and Scotland. This allows the model to account for regional variation in FMD epidemiology and 452 
animal husbandry. 453 
In order to assess the daily risk of between farm infection occurring via movement of live 454 
animals, a movement network (A) is integrated into the model, mimicking the impact of animal 455 
movements from infected farms. The probability of a susceptible farm i being infected by an 456 
exposed or infectious farm (Ej or Ij) through a live animal movement, is given by: 457 
ߣ௜ =෍ܣ௝௜൫ܧ௝ + ܫ௝൯
௝
	
Here Aji is the daily risk of movement occurring from farm j to farm i, calculated by averaging 458 
recorded cattle movements across a year; these livestock movement data were obtained from 459 
DEFRA and the Scottish Government and have been analysed in a number of studies (e.g. [14, 460 
42-44]). Given our assumptions that infection acts at the level of the entire farm, we are only 461 
concerned with batches of livestock movements, not the number of animals in these batches. Ej 462 
and Ij are indicator variables (0 or 1) which inform about the current status of farm j in the 463 
simulation. 464 
Simulations in this paper are seeded by infecting 5 (randomly chosen) farms in a 5 km cluster 465 
(in a randomly chosen location) within a given county to approximate the initial conditions of a 466 
localised outbreak; detection of the first case and the implementation of controls then follows. In 467 
line with previous work, we assume that all livestock on IPs are culled within 24 hours of being 468 
reported and all associated dangerous contacts (DCs) are culled within 48 hours [30]. 469 
Contiguous premises (CP) culling is not performed. 470 
In order to determine the effectiveness of a livestock movement ban, we utilise data from the 471 
2001 FMD epidemic that detail the costs associated with the outbreak. The economic costs of 472 
the 2001 outbreak fell into 5 distinct categories: direct costs, indirect costs, costs associated 473 
with welfare culls, losses to the agricultural sector and losses to tourism [35]. We will utilise this 474 
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economic framework to translate our simulation results into a national epidemic cost, although 475 
alternative scenarios could be considered, such as minimising the cost to the farming industry or 476 
to the UK tax-payer. In 2001 (and 2007) national scale movement bans were imposed such that 477 
animals could only be moved under specific veterinary licence. Here we relax this control 478 
measure and consider a range of movement bans that act upon all farms within a given radius 479 
of infected premises. We impose this radius based on the straight-line distance between the 480 
recorded point location (which generally identifies the farmhouse) of each pair of farms; in 481 
practise regional control teams would presumably account for the location of livestock, although 482 
this distinction is likely to be negligible for large radii. The parameters used in the FMD 483 
simulations are taken from matching regional prevalence from simulations to the results of the 484 
2001 FMD outbreak (see Supplementary Table 1). 485 
 486 
The BTV model 487 
Our model for BTV operates at the level of individual animals, replicating the known pattern of 488 
animal movements and captures the transmission of infection through spatially dispersing midge 489 
vectors that are affected by climatic conditions in a similar fashion to other spatial models of 490 
BTV transmission [33, 45-47]. 491 
The model describes each farm as a stochastic metapopulation of sheep and cattle [33, 45], the 492 
two main ruminant hosts of BTV amongst European commercial livestock. The livestock 493 
population at each farm i is subdivided by their species k and BTV infection status: susceptible 494 
(ܵ௞,௜), infected and infectious (ܫ௞,௜) and recovered and immune (ܴ௞,௜). The total population at 495 
each farm is assumed to remain static except for movement of infected animals and disease 496 
induced mortality. The infectious duration for BTV in a given animal is modelled as a multi-stage 497 
Erlang process according to commonly used estimates of BTV viraemia amongst cattle and 498 
sheep [48]. Culicoides biting midge spatial population dynamics are described using a spatial 499 
grid overlaying the UK at a 5 x 5km resolution, therefore each grid might contain 0,1, 2 or more 500 
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farms. The grid cell locations and daily mean temperature for each cell was drawn from the 501 
UKCP09 [49] retrospective data for 2007, the year of the first UK BTV outbreak. The midge 502 
population in the spatial grid at coordinate location x is described by a Poisson distribution for 503 
the number of latently infected midges (ܧெ,௫) and actively infectious midges (ܫெ,௫). The mean of 504 
these two distributions is determined by biting on infected livestock within the grid, and by 505 
dispersal of infected midges from nearby grids (see below). The latency duration (or extrinsic 506 
incubation period) of infected midges is modelled as a 10 stage temperature dependent Erlang 507 
process [31, 50].  508 
The daily number of bites emanating from the infectious midges in the grid square at location x 509 
is Poisson distributed with mean ߙ(ݐ, ݔ)ܫெ,௫, where ߙ(ݐ, ݔ) is the biting rate for midges using the 510 
mean daily temperature on day t at the grid square x [31, 48]. The expected proportion of all 511 
daily infectious bites distributed to a single animal of species k in farm i within the spatial grid 512 
box at x is: 513 
߶௞,௜ 	=
ߨ௞	(∑ ߨ௟ ௟ܰ,௜௟ )௣ିଵ
∑ (∑ ߨ௠ܰ௠,௝௠ )௣௝∈௫
.				
where ߨ௞ is the relative preference of midges for species k and p is a parameter tuning the 514 
seeking preference of midges for larger farms within the grid cell. The sum in the denominator is 515 
over all the farms in the grid box at x. Therefore, the risk of the animal being infected on each 516 
day t is: 517 
1	 − exp(− ுܲ߶௞,௜ߙ(ݐ, ݔ)ܫெ,௫). 518 
where ுܲ is the probability of BTV transmission per bite from an infectious midge.  519 
We assume that the expected number of susceptible midges arriving to bite each animal each 520 
day is proportional to the expected prediction of a seasonal and temperature dependent 521 
generalised linear mixed-effect model (GLMM) inferred from wide-scale midge trapping 522 
experiments in the UK and specialised to the activity of C. Obsoletus females [31, 51]. 523 
Underlying GLMM random effects were drawn either once per simulation for each farm (for farm 524 
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level random effects) or daily for each farm (overdispersion and autocorrelation random effects). 525 
We denote the unscaled mean biting rate prediction from the GLMM, conditional on local 526 
temperature and random effects for each farm on each day t, ܤ(ݐ, ݔ). Therefore, the expected 527 
number of newly infected midges in the grid cell at x on day t is: 528 
ݍ ௏ܲܤ(ݐ, ݔ) ∑ ∑ ߨ௞ܫ௞,௝௞௝∈௫ . 529 
Where ௏ܲ is the midge BTV infection probability per bite on an infected host, and ݍ is a 530 
parameter that scales the difference between the biting rate and the trap capture rate. 531 
In line with the known biting behaviour of Culicoides midges [52-53] we assume that all biting 532 
occurs over short dusk/dawn periods and that otherwise midges are in oogenesis, seeking 533 
oviposition sites or seeking new hosts. We model the movement of midges between daily biting 534 
as an inhomogeneous diffusion process with the local diffusion rate at each grid square x as: 535 
ܦ(ݔ) = 		 ஽బଵ	ା	క	 ∑ (∑ గ೘ே೘,ೕ೘ )೛ೕ∈ೣ . 536 
where ܦ଴ is the reference diffusivity of midges in a grid square devoid of commercial livestock 537 
hosts and ߦ is a tunable scalar. The diffusion rate for the grid box x depends on the denominator 538 
for the proportion of bites per animal; this quantity acts as an effective population size for the 539 
grid box. That is, we model diffusion as decreasing with more animals per grid square and 540 
higher values of the seeking behaviour parameter. 541 
The daily number of BTV-infected animals introduced into a farm i due to livestock movement 542 
from farm j was calculated in three steps for each day: 1) for each farm pair a movement was 543 
generated with probability ܣ௝௜ (see above), 2) if a movement occurred in step 1 it was chosen 544 
randomly to be a batch of sheep or cattle according the relative population density in the farm 545 
sending the batch, 3) a batch size was randomly generated according to species type and 546 
infected animals of the chosen species were sampled uniformly without replacement from the 547 
total population of the chosen species at the sending farm. Only infected animals were moved 548 
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within the simulation, in order to better minimise population flux and in line with other simulation 549 
studies of BTV in the UK [33].  550 
The morbidity and mortality rates associated with BTV serotype 8 infection were low during the 551 
2006 outbreak [17]. Therefore, we assume that the introduction of BTV into the UK is initially 552 
cryptic (occurring on 1st June) and the virus spreads without movement bans until it is detected 553 
by either a) the death of an animal due to disease induced mortality, or b) clinical signs of BTV 554 
are detected amongst infected animals. The probability of clinical detection per farm per species 555 
per day is: 556 
ܳ௞,௜ 	= 	1	 − 	(1 − ݌஽,௞)ூೖ,೔. 557 
where ݌஽,௞ is the daily chance of an infected animal of species k showing clinical signs of BTV. 558 
After detection of a BTV outbreak we assume that DEFRA recommendations are followed and 559 
all farms within 15km of the initial IP have all their animals investigated for BTV [54]. The initial 560 
zones (CZ, PZ and SZ) are constructed around all the detected IPs, and are extended as new 561 
IPs are detected during the ongoing outbreak. Parameters used in the BTV model are provided 562 
in Supplementary Tables 2 and 3. 563 
 564 
bTB Model 565 
In this paper we make use of a national-scale stochastic metapopulation model of bTB 566 
transmission and detection [12]. In essence the model operates at the scale of individual farms, 567 
but (unlike the FMD model) captures the stochastic cattle-level infection dynamics within a farm; 568 
this is necessary as an infected farm is likely to contain only a few infected cattle. Each farm is 569 
defined by its location and the number of susceptible, latently infected and infectious cattle 570 
present on a given day; sheep, pigs and other livestock species are assumed to have no role in 571 
bTB transmission.  572 
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The transmission and disease progression processes within the model are stochastic, and occur 573 
in discrete time as follows: for farm i the number of Susceptible, Exposed and Infectious cattle 574 
are given by: 575 
௜ܵ(ݐ + 1) 	= 	 ௜ܵ	(ݐ) 	− ߉௜,௧	
ܧ௜(ݐ + 1) 	= 	ܧ௜	(ݐ) 	+ ߉௜,௧ − ܣ௜,௧
ܫ௜(ݐ + 1) 	= 	 ܫ௜	(ݐ) 	+ ܣ௜,௧	
  
߉௜,௧ = ܤ݅݊( ௜ܵ(ݐ), 1 − ݁ݔ݌(−ߣ௜,௧))
ܣ௜,௧ = ܤ݅݊(ܧ௜(ݐ), ߙ)	
where ߣ is the force of infection acting on cattle within the farm (see below), and ߙ is the rate at 576 
which latent animals become infectious. 577 
In addition there are three deterministic demographic processes acting on the farm – births, 578 
deaths and movements – which follow the recorded pattern from the UK’s Cattle Tracing 579 
System (CTS), which is run by the British Cattle Movement Service (part of the Department for 580 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, DEFRA). All three of these processes can be considered 581 
as a movement; births are movements onto a farm without an origin and deaths are movement 582 
from a farm without a destination. For all of these movements, an individual animal is chosen 583 
randomly independent of its infection status or its history of movements. The recorded 584 
movement of ~30,000 cattle per day is one of the primary mechanisms of long-range 585 
transmission of infection from the movement of infected animals. 586 
Transmission to cattle on a given farm comes from three different sources: cattle-to-cattle 587 
transmission, transmission from infection within the farm environment and transmission from 588 
infection within the wider environment. Hence the force of infection, ߣ, to cattle on farm i is given 589 
by: 590 
ߣ௜,௧ = ߚ 	ܫ௜(ݐ)௜ܰ(ݐ) 			+ 		݂	ݒ௜(ݐ) 	+ 	ܨ	 ௜ܸ(ݐ)	
where ௜ܰ 	(= ௜ܵ + ܧ௜ + ܫ௜) is the number of cattle on farm i, v is the level of infection in the farm 591 
environment, and V is the level of infection in the wider environment which is considered to be 592 
the local parish [12]. The level of infection in the environment is increased by the proportion of 593 
infectious cattle, but wanes over time as the bacteria become non-viable. 594 
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݀ݒ௜
݀ݐ =
ܫ௜
௜ܰ
− ߳ݒ௜	 
݀ ௜ܸ
݀ݐ =
∑ ܫ௝௝	∈	௉௔௥௜௦௛	
∑ ௝ܰ௝	∈	௉௔௥௜௦௛	
			− 	߳ ௜ܸ	
 595 
 596 
These two local reservoirs of infection could both represent the persistence of infectious matter 597 
on pasture or persistence in a local wildlife reservoir. 598 
In addition, we simulate routine testing for surveillance, which follows the DEFRA rules 599 
appropriate for the time and varies between annual and 4-yearly testing depending on location. 600 
This test is not perfect [55] and we therefore use a test sensitivity of ߩ for infectious cattle and 601 
ߩா × ߩ for exposed / latent animals. Once infected cattle are detected within a farm, the animals 602 
are culled and the farm placed under movement restrictions until all its cattle clear a further two 603 
tests at 60-day intervals; in addition these farms are also subjected to further testing after 6 and 604 
12 months. 605 
The model parameter are inferred by matching simulations to the number of reactors (positive 606 
cattle) and number of failed herd tests recorded per county per year between 1997 and 2007 607 
using Sequential Monte Carlo Approximate Bayesian Computation [12]; the main parameters 608 
are given below.  609 
The model was adapted to allow us to investigate the addition of radial movement restrictions. 610 
Given that bTB is an endemic disease (unlike FMD and BTV), movement restrictions must be 611 
temporary with some means in which they are lifted from given farms in the future. In our 612 
adapted model, when a herd is first identified as being infected (that is an animal tests positive 613 
on a farm that is not under restrictions), we assume that movements from the infected farm and 614 
those within a radius of the infected farm are banned. (although we also simulate the extreme 615 
case where there are no movement bans, even on the infected farms). The infected farm is 616 
subject to the usual measures, with the positive animal(s) culled and movement restrictions in 617 
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place until two follow-up tests (at 60-day intervals) are all clear; additional tests at both 6 and 12 618 
months are scheduled.  For those farms within the radius (which may be considered at risk due 619 
to their proximity) movements are banned until a follow-up test after 30 days can be performed 620 
– following the results of this test either movements are resumed or the farm is identified as 621 
infected and the entire process is repeated. In this way, waves of testing spread through high 622 
prevalence areas. Results from such control policies are shown in the main paper. 623 
A modification to this control policy is explored further below. Farms with cattle testing positive 624 
are handled as described above; farms within the surrounding radius are only subject to follow-625 
up tests but do not have their cattle movements restricted. This policy is extended to have 626 
slightly higher incidence (due to movement of cattle to new regions) but significantly lower 627 
economic costs due to the reduction in movement restrictions. 628 
Simulations begin in 1998 and utilise the pattern of recorded movements and random herd-level 629 
test; changes to the control policy (additional radial controls and testing) is assumed to begin at 630 
the start of 2005, and its impact over 6 years on the progress of the endemic recorded. 631 
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